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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the current economic crisis put deficit financing in the centre of atten-
tion, it has been a general practice since the early 1970s, carried out on a permanent
basis in the majority of European countries. Such behaviour triggered an increase in
the debt stock relative to the GDP; that is, the pro-cyclical fiscal policy was hardly
ever able to achieve its classical objective to stabilise the national economy (EC
2000). The aim of this paper is to map out what may determine a fiscal consolida-
tion to be successful in terms of a reduced debt ratio and a positive economic
growth; to identify those conditions/factors which can be responsible for delivering
these desired effects. However, the paper points further since it tries to reconcile
the findings of our short data analysis and case studies with the experience of one
of the new member states of the EU. 
Following the short introduction, Part 2 elaborates on a simple data analysis of a
sample of old member states, concentrating on the large fiscal adjustments and their
macroeconomic consequences such as the debt-to-GDP ratio and economic activity.
A short data analysis can be indicative in several respects; however, country case
studies may contribute to a better understanding of how governments were able to
implement not just large but also permanent and growth-accelerating fiscal contrac-
tions. Accordingly, in Part 3, five cases have been selected for further study: Ireland
(1987–89), Denmark (1983–84), Netherlands (1993 and 1996), Great Britain
(1997–98) and Sweden (1996). Hopefully, the case study approach makes it possible
to concentrate on those conditions/factors that may prove to be indispensable for
The current world economic crisis induced countries to launch wide-scale
spending programmes all over the world. Member states of the European
Union have not been an exception to this trend. While deficit spending may
increase the aggregate demand, it can also accelerate indebtedness and make
the required spending cuts politically risky later on. However, deficit financing
is not a new phenomenon in the EU; it has been widely practiced in the last
couple of decades. As the crisis seems to come to an end, countries with huge
deficits should adopt exit strategies now, thereby reducing deficit and debt and
reintroducing fiscal discipline, a requirement laid down in the Stability and
Growth Pact. Nevertheless, former adjustment processes can provide ample
evidence for successful and politically viable fiscal consolidations. In certain
cases, even economic activity started to accelerate as a response to the well-
designed adjustment measures. Based on the previous experiences of EU
states, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the conditions that may
determine a fiscal consolidation to be successful in terms of a reduced debt
ratio and a positive economic growth. 
success, especially the composition of fiscal adjustment and the institutional envi-
ronment, such as the reform of the budgetary process. Part 4 concludes.
2. SUCCESSFUL FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS: A COMPARATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
First of all, we need to specify what is meant by success with respect to a fiscal con-
solidation. In the following, “successful fiscal adjustment” means that a (i) relatively
large fiscal consolidation provides (ii) a permanent recovery in public finances and
also (iii) a recovery (or acceleration) in economic activity.1 Accordingly, by using the
relevant literature, three definitions have been adopted for our specific purposes. 
(Definition 1) “Relatively large fiscal adjustment”: a fiscal consolidation in
which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves by at least 1.5 percent-
age points of the GDP. 
(Definition 2) “Permanent adjustment”: a fiscal adjustment in year t is perma-
nent if the gross debt-to-GDP ratio is at least 5 percentage points of the GDP
lower in year t+3 than in year t. 
(Definition 3) “Growth-accelerating or expansionary permanent consolida-
tion”: a permanent fiscal adjustment in year t is expansionary if the average
real GDP growth rate in years t+2 and t+3 exceeds the average real GDP
growth rate measured in years t–2 and t–1. 
First, the so-called “relatively large fiscal adjustment” will be identified in the EU-14
between 1980 and 2005. Second, the latter group will be restricted to those
episodes where the debt-to-GDP ratio fell substantially, providing a permanent con-
solidation. Third, the growth-effects of adjustment – as the politically most impor-
tant consequence – will also be taken into account, while assessing the macroeco-
nomic consequences of fiscal consolidations. 
(Ad 1) In the relevant empirical studies, fiscal consolidation is always defined in
terms of a given improvement in the specified form of fiscal balance over a given
time period. Defining the measure of adjustment is always critical since the results
may be sensitive to the chosen concept. A minimum of a 1.5 percentage point
improvement in the primary fiscal balance (in cyclically adjusted terms) is usually
characterised as a very tight adjustment indeed, which is not undertaken by govern-
ments too often.2 The relatively high threshold applied in our study enables us to
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1 By focusing on fiscal aggregates and their macroeconomic consequences (such as debt-reduction and
economic growth), the data set is comprised of the EU-14 (except Luxembourg) between 1980 and
2005. The data were taken from two sources. Fiscal aggregates are excerpted from the Economic
Outlook of the OECD (see OECD 2009), while the data on economic growth were provided by the
Statistical Annex of the European Economy, European Commission (1999 and 2009)
2 The norm in the literature is to define changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance below +/- 0.5
percentage point as neutral, while changes between +/- 0.5 percentage point and +/- 1.5 (sometimes 2)
percentage point as expansionary/tight. Above 1.5 (or sometimes 2) the change is said to be very expan-
sionary or very tight. See especially Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Hagen
et al. (2001).
select just a few, probably the most robust cases of fiscal adjustments. Moreover, the
magnitude itself makes it difficult to achieve such an enormous consolidation by
one-off measures exclusively – at least not too frequently. As far as the specification
of the balance is concerned, the OECD's cyclically adjusted (or structural) balance
was chosen in order to filter out the effects of business cycles. With cyclically adjust-
ed terms, the discretionary part of fiscal impetus can be detected.3 The reason for
concentrating on the primary balance is that interest payments are out of the direct
competence of decision-makers in the annual budgeting process, where the politi-
cal decisions are made. 
Accordingly, the total number of annual observations in the sample of EU-14 over
the period of 1980 and 2005 is 375 (25 x 15), out of which 62 episodes proved to be
exceptional adjustments, based on our Definition 1.4 Each of the 14 countries
embarked on at least one large consolidation throughout the scrutinised period,
although with a rather different frequency. While France, Germany and Spain
reduced its cyclically adjusted primary balance only once, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal adopted severe measures several times. Nevertheless, the number of
exceptional fiscal episodes exclusively cannot say anything about the degree of fis-
cal discipline or the success of an adjustment. The fact that Germany adopted a
severe contraction only once clearly reflects the fact that this country was the ideal-
type case of the stability-policy during the eighties and nineties. Intuitively, the
more frequent adjustments there are in a country, the less disciplined are public
finances. 
(Ad 2) Following our definition of successful fiscal consolidation, the group of
large fiscal episodes (62 in total) will be restricted to those only which proved to be
permanent (see Definition 2). In our sample, less than one-third of the large fiscal
adjustments provided the required 5 percentage point drop in the debt ratio, there-
by qualifying for the status of a permanent adjustment (in concrete numbers: 18 out
of the total 62 episodes – see Table 1). That is, two-thirds of the attempts to consoli-
date public finances ended up without the hoped results. Interestingly, the selected
18 episodes gravitated to 10 countries only, out of which Denmark, Ireland and
Sweden experienced at least three such successful occasions. 
It was also checked in our sample whether the 5 percentage point decline
occurred earlier than the maximum three years. The results are surprising: only four
out of the 18 episodes required three years to become effective, the rest provided a
significant fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio within one or two years already. More
impressively, in half of the cases, the decline in debt over the three year period was
above 10 percentage points. Ireland for instance produced a staggering cumulated
36.5 percentage point decline between 1986 and 1992. The same country experi-
enced, however, a catastrophic fiscal consolidation just a few years earlier, in
1982–83, when the unsuccessful attempt ended up with a 38.4 percentage point
total increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio by 1986. The UK (1998–2001), the
Netherlands (1996–99), Belgium (1993–96), Denmark (1984–87), Italy
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3 Detecting the cyclical component in fiscal variables is not without controversies, however (see espe-
cially P. Kiss and Vadas 2005).
4 Each episode is enlisted in Table 1.
(1997–2000) and Sweden (1996–99 and 2005–08) also experienced a robust drop
in the debt ratio due to fiscal contraction. It is worth noticing, however, that neither
the UK nor Sweden belongs to the single currency area, for these countries the ulti-
mate reason for fiscal restructuring was not simply the fulfilment of the Maastricht
numerology. On the other hand, Austria, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain – all
are members of the euro-zone – never experienced significant drops in their debt
ratios between 1980 and 2005, albeit some of them initiated large scale consolida-
tions.5 (Further information in Figure 1.)
Source: own compilation based on the data set of OECD (2006).
Note: 18 episodes proved to be permanent according to our Definition 2, but the Figure displays only
eight of them which also provided some acceleration in economic output.
Figure 1 Large-scale adjustments with a significant drop in the debt-to-GDP ratio
(Ad 3) A large fiscal consolidation was said to be successful if not just the debt
ratio fell significantly, but economic activity also accelerated due to the adjustment
efforts. That growth has been chosen as a part of the definition of success can be
rationalised by the fact that without the ultimate growth effects, which can make fis-
cal contraction more acceptable by the public, it is hard to believe that politicians
would be willing to embark on wide-scale consolidations programmes (see especial-
ly Benczes 2008). Based on our Definition 3, nine episodes out of the total 18 large
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5 Italy, another EMU member state, provided a rather hectic performance during the nineties by strug-
gling with reducing its debt-ratio. The first attempt proved to be a total failure: the debt ratio increased
between 1993 and 1996 by 11 percentage points. The negative trend was broken off only by the 1996-
97 consolidation attempt, assuring Italy's position among the members of the euro-zone.
and permanent adjustments proved to be growth-supporting in our sample.6 See
Table 1.
Table 1 Summary table of successful adjustments in the EU-14
(the year in which fiscal adjustment evolved)
Source: own construction.
It might be surprising indeed that more than half of the large and permanent adjust-
ments qualified also for being growth-supporting. According to the Keynesian argu-
ment, a large and permanent adjustment ends up in a deceleration of economic
activity due to the positive fiscal multiplier. However, in our sample it turned out
that quite a few episodes do not support this general claim. In fact, except for Italy
(1997), these fiscal episodes provided some increase in the level of economic activ-
ity in the first year already. Such surprising outcomes are often labelled as the per-
verse effects of fiscal policy, which also received a new name in modern macro
economy: non-Keynesian effects.7
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6 It is reasonable, however, to reduce the nine episodes to eight only in the further study, because Ireland
proved to be successful in two consecutive years (1987–88). 
7 The term “non-Keynesian effects” refers by definition to a situation where the fiscal multiplier turns out
to be negative: the indirect effects of fiscal impetus on private consumption and/or investment offset the
direct effects of government action. Such a surprising outcome is triggered by the changing behaviour of
rational, forward-looking private agents, who expect their tax liabilities to decline in the future and/or
who work under a more competitive (wage) structure in the international market (see especially Giavazzi
and Pagano 1990).
Large fiscal
adjustments
by Definition 1
Permanent
adjustments
by Definition 2
Successful (permanent
and expansionary)
adjustments
by Definition 3
Austria 1984, 1996, 1997, 2001 – –
Belgium 1982, 1984, 1985, 1993 1993 1993
Denmark 1983, 1984, 1986, 1999,2005 1984, 1986, 1999 1984
Finland 1981, 1984, 1988, 1993,1998, 2000 1998 –
France 1996 – –
Germany 1989 – –
Greece 1982, 1986, 1987, 1991,1994, 1996, 2005 – –
Ireland 1982, 1983, 1987, 1988,1989, 2003 1987, 1988, 1989 1987, 1988
Italy 1982, 1983, 1991, 1992,1993, 1997 1997 1997
Netherlands 1982, 1991, 1993, 1996,2005 1993, 1996 1993, 1996
Portugal 1982, 1983, 1986, 1988,1992, 2002 1992 –
Spain 1992 – –
Sweden 1981, 1983, 1986, 1987,1996, 2005 1986, 1987, 1996, 2005 1996
UK 1980, 1996, 1997, 1998 1997, 1998 1997
Number of total
observations 62 18 9
Certainly, the descriptive data analysis of large fiscal adjustments and their
macroeconomic consequences is not without doubts. Nevertheless, the internation-
al comparative studies on the success of fiscal consolidation have one main point in
common: they almost all found some evidence for success.8 By summarising the
main findings of Part 2, two major conclusions can be drawn. First, not every single
fiscal consolidation results in improved public finances (that is, in a reduced debt-
to-GDP ratio); in fact, a lasting debt-reduction is rather rare. Second, a fiscal contrac-
tion is not always accompanied by economic decline; in fact, there are some
instances when economic activity does accelerate relatively early on. 
3. FIVE SUCCESSFUL EPISODES
A short data analysis can be indicative in several respects; however, country case stud-
ies may contribute to a better understanding of how governments were able to imple-
ment not just large but also permanent and growth-accelerating fiscal contractions –
an unexpected double result that should be achieved now as the current economic
crisis is coming to its end. Accordingly, five cases (out of our eight episodes) have
been selected from our EU-14 sample for further study. The five case studies will be
the following: Ireland (1987–89), Denmark (1983–84), Netherlands (1993 and 1996),
Sweden (1996) and Great Britain (1997–98). Belgium (1993) and Italy (1997) have
been left out from the further study since their initial conditions (the extremely high
level of debt reaching 110–120 per cent of their GDP) can make the lessons not that
straightforward. Moreover, Belgium experienced a significant drop in economic
growth already in the second year after the adjustment, while Italy's adjustment
efforts were strongly supplemented by creative accounting measures in 1997. 
3.1 THE COMPOSITION OF ADJUSTMENT
Ireland
After the first failed fiscal consolidation of 1982–83, the newly elected right-wing
cabinet initiated an ambitious adjustment programme in 1987, followed by several
other supplementing economic measures. The consolidation – started in February
1987 – was based exclusively on expenditure cuts; in fact, taxes even fell slightly
between 1987 and 1989 (see Table 2). Throughout these years, the total spending
was decreased by 8.5 per cent of the GDP and revenues also declined by a couple of
percentage points. The Irish government did not hesitate after a failed adjustment
attempt in 1982 to drastically cut back the politically most sensitive items such as
the wage bill of the public sector and the cuts in transfers. 
More importantly, between 1988 and 1989, the Irish government reduced the
number of public servants by 9 per cent, by which 30 000 people were made redun-
dant. This was carried out not simply in the form of dismissals, but rather in the
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form of early retirement and by freezing recruitments. The fiscal consolidation pro-
gramme was supplemented with a wage agreement among social partners and the
state in both the private and the public sector. One of the crucial elements of the
wage agreement between social partners was that the claims on real wage increase
could not exceed improvements in productivity. The significant lay-off proved to be
politically sustainable because it involved a wide-scale tax reduction, and as a corol-
lary, the private sector absorbed so many that unemployment rate even decelerated.
Additionally, the government spent a significant amount of money on re-training
courses. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that an increase in employment and an overall
recovery of the economy probably would not have been possible without a
favourable international economic environment, especially in the case of the most
important trading partners of Ireland, which boosted export. Besides, the accelera-
tion of capital inflow via foreign direct investment also contributed to the positive
growth effects. Capital inflow was also supported by the timely liberalisation of cap-
ital accounts and the devaluation of the Irish pound in 1986. In fact, the lowest cor-
porate tax was introduced, which – together with low wages and the devaluated
Irish pound – made Ireland attractive for foreign investors, especially in comparison
to other EU countries. In sum, the restored overall competitiveness of the Irish econ-
omy, along with the accommodative monetary and exchange rate policy were inte-
gral parts of the economic policy package of the right-wing cabinet. 
Denmark (1983–84)
The Danish started the consolidation in the first half of the eighties, following a seri-
ous deterioration in fiscal performance, price stability, and economic activity.
Public debt doubled within five years (before the consolidation occurred), and fis-
cal deficit got close to 10 per cent. As opposed to the other four countries, howev-
er, Denmark initiated a revenue-based adjustment (Table 2), although according to
other authors, it is better to say that it embarked on a mixed strategy of both expen-
diture cuts and revenue increase (see especially Perotti et al. 1998). 
For sure, besides revenue increase, the spending cut was unavoidable since the
redistribution achieved an extremely high ratio in the country: 60 per cent of the
GDP by 1980. Similarly to Ireland, transfers and compensation to employees were
decreased – although at a more moderate rate. In concrete terms, the earlier prac-
tice of price indexation of welfare spending was given up and maximum ceilings on
some welfare cash benefits (such as sickness) were introduced. Wage-freezing, dras-
tic stop on pension payments and unemployment benefits contributed to the suc-
cess of the consolidation programme, too. The determination of the government
can be touched upon by contrasting current spending cuts with cuts in public
investment: the ratio of current expenditure cuts versus public investment was
around 5. Still, the balance of overall expenditures did not improve due to the steep
increase in the payment of interest. The dramatic recovery in fiscal balance (which
turned into a sufficit as early as 1985) was therefore mostly due to the significant
increase of direct taxes (both on business and households) and social security con-
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tributions. Revenues increased by 7 per cent of the GDP between 1981 and 1988,
causing a serious increase in the tax burden. 
The judgement of the Danish “miracle” is not without doubts, however. On the
one hand, the favourable internal and external economic conditions might have
played a crucial role in the success story of the early eighties – especially the easing
of monetary policy due to the strengthened credibility of macroeconomic policies.
On the other hand, in 1987, wage-freezing was abolished and employees pushed the
government successfully towards a serious wage increase. The suspension of wage
moderation broke the positive growth trend of the economy experienced through
the years of adjustment. Significant increase in real costs of labour deteriorated com-
petitiveness and economic growth slowed down from 1988 onwards. That is,
Denmark did experience a successful fiscal consolidation which, however, did not
prove to be long-lived. 
The Netherlands (1993 and 1996)
Seemingly, the Dutch adjustment efforts coincide with the launching of the EMU
plan. However, the restructuring of the Holland public finances had already started
in the eighties, well before the Maastricht process. By 1997, public spending had
decreased by one-third from the peak reached in 1983 (in GDP). The wide-scale
reforms of the mid-eighties encompassed the following elements: mutually strength-
ening measures in fiscal policy and labour incomes policy (along with labour mar-
ket reform) such as tax cut and the reduction of the real value of minimum wage.
Social transfers were cut back significantly too: welfare transfers (especially sick-
ness and disability benefits) were vigorously reduced and restructured. Public sec-
tor salaries were cut back and the links between the wages of the public and the pri-
vate sector were also severed. 
Starting in 1993, the Netherlands embarked on a drastic reduction of current
expenditures: the level of current expenditure declined from 50.6 per cent (1993)
to 42.3 per cent (1998). Savings on final consumption and interest payments con-
tributed significantly to the recovery of the general budget. Interestingly, current
revenues fell enormously, too: the decrease was 4.7 points of the GDP between 1992
and 1997 (data can be found in Table 2). The government and the trade unions
worked in close cooperation with each other and were able to increase the flexibil-
ity of the Dutch labour market substantially, thereby the demand for labour rose,
too. The improvement in competitiveness produced a robust growth compared to
the neighbouring countries (Watson et al. 1999). In sum, the Dutch success story
was not a one-off event, but a result of a long process that had already started in the
early eighties. The ultimate aim of the reform was not simply the reduction of deficit
and debt but the restoration of competitiveness of the overall economy, thereby pro-
moting sustainability.
The UK (1997–98)
One of the most successful fiscal stabilisations was achieved in the UK in the
nineties. Nevertheless, the British experience received attention not just because of
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the significant improvement in fiscal stance but also due to the remarkably high
level of real growth rate and falling rate of unemployment, stabilising at 5–6 per
cent in the second half of the nineties, an outstandingly low level in comparison
with other EU countries.9 As far as the fiscal position is concerned, the debt-to-GDP
ratio was placed on a downward course: the average ratio between 1991 and 1995
was recorded at 51.8 per cent, while the average of 1996 and 2000 was reduced by
10 percentage points. The same ratios for the deficit were 6.0 per cent versus 0.3
per cent. From 1998 onwards, the general government balance turned into a sufficit
which prevailed until 2001. Meanwhile, the growth rate of the country accelerated,
providing a spectacular 3.2 per cent annual average in the second half of the
nineties, as opposed to 1.7 per cent in the first half of that decade. This certainly rais-
es the issue of causality: it might be easily the case that the recovery in economic
performance made it possible for the government to collect more revenues while
spending less, thereby experiencing a recovery in the general balance.10
Turning to the composition of adjustment, Table 2 in fact reveals that both the
increased revenues (possibly due to the accelerated economic growth) and the
reduced expenditures contributed significantly to the recovery in fiscal position.
While current expenditures exceeded current revenues by 2 percentage points (in
GDP) in 1996, three years later the current revenues were well above current expen-
ditures. The change in the trend can be traced back to several budget items: there
was a general decrease in the level of all expenditure-types in the UK. Compensation
per employees for instance witnessed a decline of 0.8 percentage points (in GDP),
which means a 7.5 per cent decrease (using 1996 the base year). Reductions in pub-
lic investment and interest payment contributed significantly to the recovery of the
general balance, too. The success of the corrections was mainly the result of the
increased credibility of policymakers and the improved transparency of the policy-
making process (see in section 3.2). Moreover, the commitment of New Labour was
also reflected in the fact that several public services were privatised and thereby the
number of public sector workers dropped significantly. The status of public sector
employees also changed, by which the government was able to reduce the staff of
the education sector for instance (OECD 2001).
Sweden (1994–97)
The overheated economy of Sweden in the late eighties and early nineties found
itself in an unpleasant recession, boosting government spending and dampening
revenues. The relatively large size of the public sector in Sweden (two-thirds of the
income was centralised) gave birth to a generous welfare state where even the auto-
matic stabilisers could have a devastating effect in times of recession on the fiscal
position of the general government. Accordingly, the dramatic increase in the num-
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9 The IMF (1998) in fact warned the country that an overheating might have evolved in 1998 already,
due to the strong performance of the economy. 
10 According to the IMF (1999: 4), for instance, the strong recovery of the budget was “transient in
nature, and hence not grounds to relax policies. The bulk of the gains [of the accelerated economic
growth] appears to be cyclical, reflecting the greater buoyancy of the economy.”
ber of unemployed (which peaked at almost 9 per cent in the early nineties from an
extremely low level of 1.8 per cent in the eighties) contributed significantly to the
undermining of fiscal sustainability in the early nineties. Deficit was higher than 10
per cent for several years before the adjustment was implemented, and the debt
ratio was 1.5 times higher than just half a decade before.
The drastic changes in the fiscal course of Sweden were initiated after the crisis
from 1994 onwards which were, however, preceded by a strong devaluation of the
Swedish koruna and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime later on.
Revenues were increased dramatically in 1996; while the general level of spending
decreased by around 8 percentage points (in GDP) between 1993 and 1998. By
decomposing expenditures, it becomes visible that mostly current spending, espe-
cially the transfers to households were cut back significantly (see Table 2).
Table 2 The composition of fiscal adjustments 
Source: EC (2006).
Remarks: the data cover the years of the adjustment itself, plus one year before and after the consolida-
tion was initiated.
In Sweden, the government tried to implement a shift from a general, all-encompass-
ing regime to an individual-based, targeting scheme by redistributing sources to
those in need. Childcare and family allowances, along with housing support – polit-
ically highly sensitive measures – were reduced substantially.11 By restructuring the
welfare state, Sweden has introduced a funded pillar in its pension system, thereby
reducing the increasing burden of the ageing population. The government achieved
a positive primary balance as early as 1996, putting an end to debt accumulation (in
2000 it was already below the Maastricht criterion with its value of 52.8 per cent).
Remarkably, the relatively low performance of the economy showing a 0.7 average
growth rate per year between 1991 and 1995, showed a steady increase by climbing
to 1.3 per cent in 1996, 2.4 in 1997, 3.6 in 1998, and peaking at 4.6 in 1999. In sum,
after the crisis years, due to a quick and credible policy and regime change, the
Swedish economy bounced back relatively quickly, and its economic performance –
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11 The IMF (2003) also added that the decline in current transfers also reflected the privatisation efforts
and the reform of the pension system.
Denmark
(1982–1985)
Ireland
(1986–1990)
Netherlands
(1992–1997)
Sweden
(1993–1998)
UK
(1996–1999)
General government balance +6.9 +7.8 +3.0 +13.2 +5.2
Current revenue +4.7 –2.5 –4.7 +1.1 +1.9
Current expenditure –0.7 –7.7 –7.0 –8.1 –2.8
Final consumption –2.8 –2.2 –1.4 –2.0 –0.8
Compensation of employees –2.0 –1.2 –0.8 –2.4 –0.8
Social transfers in kind –2.0 –1.2 –0.6 –1.0 –0.2
Subsidies –0.3 –0.8 –0.8 –2.3 –0.1
Interest payment +3.8 –1.2 –1.1 –0.2 –0.5
Public investment –0.4 –1.4 –0.3 –0.6 –0.4
regarding growth – can be compared only to the golden ages of the sixties, the hey-
days of the welfare state. 
The case studies nicely illustrated that the composition of fiscal consolidation
can have a significant effect on determining whether an adjustment proves to be
successful. The short case studies underpinned the idea that expenditure-based fis-
cal stabilisations have a significantly higher chance of ending up in reduced-cost
adjustment than revenue-based adjustments. It has been also revealed that basically
two budget elements need to be cut back if the government aims at reducing the
debt stock and also producing growth effects relatively early on: (1) compensation
of public sector employees and (2) household transfers. Nevertheless, these items
are considered to be the politically most sensitive items of the budget, the constitu-
tive elements of any welfare state. Therefore, the cutback of these politically sensi-
tive items may call for political decisiveness which in turn can be backed up by
changed institutional conditions, especially a centralised budgeting process and/or
a restructuring of the labour market.
3.2 THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC BUDGETING
According to the findings of the political economy literature on deficit bias, the
decentralized nature of public budgeting, the lack of a firm-handed finance or prime
minister, the lack of a coalition agreement, and the absence of transparency result in
a deficit bias which makes it impossible to achieve a close to balanced position of the
budget. Reforming the budget process, strengthening transparency and introducing
binding fiscal rules (such as the Maastricht fiscal criteria for instance) can induce
therefore significant recovery in the budget balance.12 Any change in the institution-
al design of the budgetary process (and/or the adoption of numerical fiscal policy
rules) induces automatically a change in political motives. The inefficient allocation
of resources can be reduced significantly by the appropriate design of fiscal institu-
tions, which might not be a first best solution for providing socially optimal resource
allocation, but still works as a second best scenario. Accordingly, Hagen (1992:54–55)
argues: “[o]ur results suggest that institutional reform of the budgeting process is a
promising avenue to achieve a large degree of fiscal discipline.”
Among others, Hauptmeier et al. (2006) in their empirical study argue that
expenditure reduction is always embedded in a more comprehensive reform pack-
age inclusive of the reform of fiscal institutions and structural measures. “Virtually
all episodes of ambitious reform feature a significant strengthening of national and
sub-national budgetary procedures and institutions… one could indeed talk about a
major change in the policy regime” (ibid. 9). Fiscal adjustment is therefore initiated
with the ultimate aim of achieving long-term macroeconomic stability. The authors'
claim can be supported by the experience of several European countries, inclusive
of the five states that have been selected for a deeper scrutiny in this study. Besides
the widely known fiscal convergence criteria of Maastricht, several EU member
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states introduced so-called expenditure rules in the nineties. Instead of deficit and
debt criteria covering public finances as a whole (such as the Maastricht reference
values), these expenditure rules (limits) corresponded to different chapters of the
budget, which made them more transparent and reflected personal responsibilities.
Generally speaking, the advantage of an expenditure rule is that it guarantees the
internalisation of the full costs of public spending, i.e. the rule ensures that policy-
makers take explicitly into account the budget constraint of the government. 
Expenditure rules are usually embedded into a medium-term fiscal framework.
The medium-term plan is not simply informative but can be adopted as a law by the
national legislation. The essence of medium-term fiscal framework is that the gov-
ernment sends out a clear signal to the market about its commitment on fiscal con-
solidation, proving that fiscal adjustment is not a one-off measure but part of a
coherent long-term economic programme. The framework main contain major eco-
nomic policy objectives, the assumed macro-economic environment and develop-
ment path, the programming time span, a list of expenditure items, a definition of
exceptional and transitional conditions, the standard exemptions from expenditure
limits – especially cyclically sensitive factors, such as unemployment benefit and
reserve funds. Such a framework has been adopted earlier in Australia, Canada or
New Zealand. Among the EU member states, it was Finland, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Denmark and the UK (countries under scrutiny of this paper), and
later on Germany and Spain that introduced national medium-term fiscal planning
programmes in order to achieve a successful fiscal consolidation.13
One of the most well-known system of expenditure rules has been adopted in
Sweden, where starting in 1996, the Act on Public Finances introduced 27 nominal
expenditure caps for all of the lines of the central budget and the social security sys-
tem. The aim has been to achieve a 2 per cent surplus in the cyclically adjusted total
balance. The country initiated even constitutional amendments in order to cement
the reform steps. The finance minister's position in the cabinet was substantially
strengthened and also the strength of the minority government vis-a`-vis the opposi-
tion forces was increased significantly, thereby making it possible for the incum-
bents to scale down the politically motivated overspending activity dramatically. 
Similar to Sweden, but almost ten years earlier, the Irish right-wing government
also secured the position of the finance minister. As a corollary, the government
made the claims of spending ministries redundant and guaranteed a tough expendi-
ture-based consolidation. In fact, the whole reform process was executed by the
Irish Finance Ministry, which enjoyed the full-hearted support of the prime minis-
ter. Interestingly enough, the seemingly over-centralised power of the executive
body did not trigger severe attacks from the side of the opposition in the parliament
or the wider public, that is, a strong consensus supported the reform programmes.14
94 KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2010/3  SPECIAL ISSUE
13 Although Finland is not among the selected cases, because it did not fulfil the second requirement of
success, it is worth noting that Finland was able to achieve a dramatic drop in its debt ratio and also the
economic performance accelerated substantially some years later following the fiscal contraction of
1998.
14 See especially Hallerberg (2004).
As far as the Dutch reform attempts are concerned, they first adopted a medium-
term fiscal framework from 1994 onwards and after that a binding coalition agree-
ment in 1998.15 The aim was the same in both cases: to reduce public spending in
the sphere of the central government and the social security system. The expendi-
ture limits were expressed in real terms and also rainy day funds were created in
order to finance temporary overspendings. One of the most important aspects of
the Dutch medium-term planning was that the decisions on spending and revenues
were clearly distinguished from each other. 
Nevertheless, it was probably the UK which developed the most sophisticated
system of medium-term planning. The British have adopted a programme, the ele-
ments of which have to correspond to five main points: specificity, measurable,
adoptability, relevance and timing, or to use the English abbreviation, SMART. Both
spending ministries and budget offices have to renew their fiscal framework pro-
grammes every two years, in which they must report on the use of discretionary
spending that has to be in line with the so-called departmental expenditure limits
(no overspending is tolerated). These data are made available for the wider public
as well in a document called “public service agreements”. In accordance with the
programme-budgeting, the planners do not focus on the inputs (financial sources),
but the measurable and controllable outputs (services). Another interesting aspect
of the British planning system was that a 4 to 6 per cent of particular expenditures
were allocated to a reserve fund which was used up only in extraordinary times.
Similarly to Sweden and Ireland, the UK also transposed substantial political power
on the Chancellor, who was backed by the prime minister.
Certainly, the crisis of 2008 and 2009 significantly changed the previously estab-
lished fiscal regimes in each of the analysed countries. Even the most developed
British fiscal framework was suspended in 2008. The UK was not able to meet its
national fiscal rules established in 1997. Nevertheless, countries have started to
negotiate on the main aspects of a future fiscal framework in order to create a cred-
ible exit strategy that puts back public finances on the track of sustainability.
4. CONCLUSION
The ultimate aim of this paper was to provide some lessons about how successful fis-
cal consolidation can be achieved. As a first step a short statistical analysis made it
overt that not every single fiscal consolidation results in improved public finances;
in fact, a lasting debt-reduction is rather rare. More surprisingly, however, a fiscal
contraction is not always accompanied by economic decline. It has been shown that
there were some instances when economic activity did accelerate relatively early on
in EU countries between 1980 and 2005. 
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15 In their comparative studies, Perotti et al. (1998) and Hallerberg and Hagen (1999) recommended binding
coalition agreements for continental Europe to reduce deficit bias. Such an agreement contains formal
objectives and rules - in the form of numerical targets for instance - which can guarantee fiscal discipline
in the long run. The contract approach proves to be superior to the delegation one (where the position of
finance minister is strengthened vis-a-vis the other ministries) in the case of coalition governments. 
Relying on the “successful” episodes of five countries, it was also shown that the
consolidations were initiated almost exclusively on the expenditure side. Ireland
provided one of the most remarkable fiscal adjustments in the second half of the
1980s. Both the deficit and the debt ratios dropped substantially, while economic
activity accelerated to staggering levels. In Great Britain, expenditure cuts played a
central role also in the adjustment process. In addition to transfers, the freezing and
reduction of government wages proved to be useful in stabilising fiscal position,
thereby providing a ground for economic growth even in the short run.16 The
Netherlands benefited from the Maastricht process of the nineties, which triggered
two adjustment waves in the country. Nevertheless, some corrections had been
already initiated in the eighties. The crisis-hit Sweden implemented a drastic consol-
idation between 1994 and 1997: it cut back primarily the transfers to households,
that is, it was ready to reform the Nordic welfare state. Denmark is not a trivial case,
however, in the sense that both revenue increase and spending cuts contributed to
the short-lived economic recovery during the mid-eighties. Unfortunately for
Denmark, a reversal evolved in its fiscal profile as early as 1987, resulting in a dete-
riorated fiscal balance. 
By studying the experiences of EU countries, it has been concluded that the suc-
cess of a fiscal consolidation is very much dependant on the budgetary decision-mak-
ing process, its transparency and the power structure within the cabinet. Therefore,
it seems to be reasonable to recognise that if the excessive deficit is the result of con-
tinuous collisions of interests within the government (or parliament) and/or of insuf-
ficient coordination, then the solution is in the discontinuation of political fragmen-
tation and the strengthening of centralisation. Accordingly, besides the composition
of adjustment, the redesign of the budgetary process can substantially increase the
chance of success. The centralisation of political power, the adoption of a binding
coalition agreement possibly supplemented by a medium-term fiscal framework and
the strengthening of the position of the finance minister can make it more likely for
a consolidation to deliver permanent and growth-supporting results. 
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16 Nevertheless, both Ireland and the UK failed to maintain fiscal discipline in the last couple of years.
Ireland quadrupled its debt ratio, while the UK doubled it in just five years by 2010. That is, even the
most successful countries fail to meet fiscal discipline on every occasion. Certainly, the current crisis
hit both countries severely, but the magnitude of indebtedness has also revealed serious structural
deficiencies in their respective economies.
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